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Abstract. The three-part article of which this one is Part III is predicated on the principle that creativity is a universal activity,
essential in an evolutionary perspective to adaptation and sustainability. This work on the sociology of creativity has three
purposes: (1) to develop the argument that key factors in creative activity are socially based and developed; hence, sociology
can contribute significantly to understanding and explaining human creativity; (2) to present a systems approach which
enables us to link in a systematic and coherent way the disparate social factors and mechanisms that are involved in creative
activity and to describe and explain creativity; (3) to illustrate a sociological systems theory’s (Actor-Systems-Dynamics)
conceptualization of multiple interrelated institutional, cultural, and interaction factors and mechanisms – and their role in
creativity and innovative developments in diverse empirical cases.
Part I of this article introduced and applied a general model of innovation and creative development stressing the socio-
cultural and political embeddedness of agents, either as individuals or groups, in their creative activities and innovative
productions. Part II investigated the “context of innovation and discovery” considering a wide range of applications and
illustrations. This 3rd segment, Part III, specifies and analyzes the “context of receptivity and institutionalization” where
innovations and creative developments are socially accepted, legitimized, and institutionalized or rejected and suppressed.
A number of cases and illustrations are considered. Power considerations are part and parcel of these analyses, for instance
the role of the state as well as powerful private interests and social movements in facilitating and/or constraining innovations
and creative developments in society.
In the perspective presented here, generally speaking, creativity can be consistently and systematically considered to a
great extent as social, cultural, institutional and material as much as psychological or biological.
Keywords: Creativity, innovative development, field, agency, rule regime, creative production function, context of creativity,
context of receptivity, power, the state, institutionalization
1. Introduction
This is Part III of a three-part article. The article is
predicated on the principle that creativity is a univer-
sal activity, essential in an evolutionary perspective,
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to adaptation and sustainability. This work on the
sociology of creativity has three purposes: (1) to
develop the argument that key factors in creative
activity are socially based and developed; hence,
sociology can contribute significantly to understand-
ing and explaining human creativity; (2) to present
a systems approach which enables us to link in a
systematic and coherent way the disparate social fac-
tors and mechanisms that are involved in creative
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activity and to describe and explain creativity; (3)
to illustrate a particular sociological systems the-
ory’s (Actor-Systems-Dynamics) conceptualization
of multiple interrelated institutional, cultural, and
interaction factors and mechanisms and their role
in creativity and innovative development in diverse
empirical cases.1
Part I introduced and applied a general model of
innovation and creative development stressing the
socio-cultural and political embeddedness of agents
[9, 20] either as individuals or groups, in their cre-
ative activities and innovative productions. Agents
are viewed as socialized agents, carriers of socio-
cultural knowledge, including some of the knowledge
essential to engage in creative processes in a par-
ticular domain or field. In their creativity, agents
manipulate symbols, rules, technologies, and mate-
rials that are socially derived and developed. Their
motivation for doing what they do derives in part from
their social roles and positions, in part in response
to situational incentives and opportunities – many
socially constructed – shaping their interaction situa-
tions and domains. Their capabilities including their
social powers derive from the culturally and institu-
tional frameworks in which they are involved.
Part II investigated the “context of innovation and
discovery” considering applications and illustrations
in the context of organic groups, networks, organi-
zations, and entire communities. This third segment,
Part III, specifies and analyzes the “context of accep-
tance and institutionalization” where innovations
and creative developments are socially accepted,
legitimized, and institutionalized or rejected and sup-
pressed. A number of cases and illustrations are
considered. Power considerations are part and par-
cel of these analyses, for instance the role of the
state as well as powerful private interests and social
movements in facilitating and/or constraining inno-
vations and creative developments in society. Also,
consideration is given to the mixed receptivity of
highly innovative contemporary developments such
as GMOs and nano-materials (presented in Part II).
We stress the complexity of some receptivity con-
texts and, indeed, the increasing complexity as more
and more “stakeholders” engage in the arena(s) and
try to influence developments, increasing uncertainty
and risk. At the same time, many high-tech innova-
tions (as well as large-scale undertakings) requiring
major financial and technical resource inputs, are
1 Burns (2006) provides an overview of several sociological
systems theories.
made highly risky because of the complexity and the
growing number of stakeholders driven to influence
the creative development.
2. Social context of reception: Agents and
mechanisms of selection, legitimation, and
institutionalization by key social agents
and mechanisms
2.1. Acceptance/incorporation/
institutionalization
As articulated in Part I, “creations” are subject
to selective, and institutionalizing environments –
which are in large part social, economic, and political
but also material and ecological. Key actors in selec-
tive environments act in response to an innovator’s
creations supporting them or penalizing/obstructing
them to varying degrees in the field F and/or in
the more encompassing social systems. Thus, many
highly innovative creations may not be accepted and
institutionalized (e.g. patented) and brought out in a
market or other social field or space.
Typically, there are several phases of selection
contexts, from the local or immediate selective envi-
ronment, to eventually more encompassing systems
including legal, economic, and political (as suggested
in Fig. 2, Part I and Fig. 3B below). Responsive agents
configured in networks, groups, organizations in the
environment are essential to explaining the success
or failure of innovative initiatives, their social accep-
tance or rejection, respectively.2
Creative action may be blocked through several
mechanisms: because of coercive and/or persuasive
opposition;3 because of a lack or denial of sufficient
resources, necessary knowledge, and actor perfor-
mance capabilities; or because alternative competing
2 Among the key mechanisms are those that facilitate (and those
agents facilitating) the spread of knowledge of an innovation.
Included here is the observation – in spite of what some experts
in a field say, practitioners observe that a new technology, strat-
egy, rule complex, category system, symbol system “works,” that
it functions effectively, and/or that opinion-leaders in networks or
media spheres advocate it. In general, experts may one judgment,
and practitioners make another.
3 Many inventions/creations – patented and non-patented never
reach the point of commercial, military, governmental, profes-
sional (or other) applications. The blockage may occur within an
organization as in the case of PARC’s PC development (at Xerox)
[6] or in a larger political-administrative context as in the case of
Stalin’s regime blocking genetic as well as relativity research/or
the EU block in the realization of GMOs.
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Fig. 3B. Model of Multiple Factors of Innovation and Creativity in a Social/Ecological Context.
developments may prove more attractive or more
effective.
Experts (those recognized as capable of judging)
in a “discipline” or field assess and encourage (or
discourage) an innovation (evaluating whether “it’s
nonsense” or something “useful” or “promising”).
In many cases, “experts” (if they are in agreement)
can determine whether an innovation is approved,
applied, and developed – or ignored and forgotten
and unlikely to be accepted and institutionalized.
For instance, key people at an organization or in
a field may judge their approval and support of an
innovative idea, design, technology, or system but
the “market” or other institutional contexts do not
approve and ignore or reject it. Agents in these larger
contexts (political, economic, or cultural) may negate
the innovation, although the initiating entrepreneurs,
engineers, managers, and other experts more directly
involved were all positively in agreement about its
value or promise. Or, in the long-run, the natural
environment may penalize, block or frustrate the
realization and sustainability of the innovation. The
context of mechanisms of judgment, acceptance (or
rejection), legitimation and institutionalization is
typically characterized by other processes than those
associated with the innovation/discovery context
(see Parts I and II).4
4 Several creativity researchers conflate these contexts (see
Table 2 in Part I).
In general, there is a politics to creativity, as in
the case of most social change in terms of the mobi-
lization of support and acceptance or opposition and
suppression [13, 15]. Still, even if initially accepted
and brought into social fields including markets, an
innovation may fail to gain wider acceptability, or
may fail sooner or later in performance, thus joining
the tens of thousands of creations that don’t work out
(those that never come to fruition or those that have
“succeeded” but over time have been confronted with
sufficient mobilized opposition to make the innova-
tion non-sustainable).
2.2. Illustrations of selection, legitimation and
institutionalization of innovative initiatives
and creative developments
In many areas of human endeavor, we have sug-
gested that the challenge is not just to produce novelty
(there are tens of thousands of novel household appli-
ances, weapons, chemicals, medicines, production
techniques, etc. that have been produced in the past
100 years and earlier (see Table 1, Part I). But there
have also been major challenges to introducing and
gaining their acceptance in relevant areas of applica-
tion. Advanced societies see themselves as relatively
“open” to innovation– arguably more so than
many traditional societies; we witness many inno-
vations being introduced, applied and developed –
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Table 1
Social agents and types of innovation and development
CHANGE AGENT
CONDITIONS
ADAPTIVE OR
INCREMENTAL CHANGE
RADICAL CHANGE IN
SINGLE FIELD
RADICAL CHANGE IN
MULTIPLE FIELDS AND
SECTORS
NO COMMITTED,
KNOWLEDGEABLE, OR
CAPABLE ENTREPRENEUR
OR CHANGE AGENT
No Change No Change No Change
COMMITTED CHANGE
AGENT BUT WEAK IN
KNOWLEDGE,
AUTHORITY, RESOURCE
CONTROL &
SOCIO-POLITICAL
POWER
Low Likelihood of The
Desired Innovation
Innovation unlikely Innovation unlikely
COMMITTED
KNOWLEGEABLE
CHANGE AGENT,
POWERFUL IN ONE
STRATEGIC FIELD (She
has property rights,
administrative authority, and
access to other power
resources, or political
mandate)
Likelihood of the Innovation
in the Relevant Field
Innovation likely if change
agent’s power and knowledge
is based solidly in the relevant
field. Otherwise, innovation
highly uncertain, if not
unlikely
Innovation very uncertain
(must be negotiated).
Necessary changes readily
blocked in spheres where
change agent weak and/or
opposition and structural
constraints are powerful
COMMITTED,
KNOWLEDGEABLE
CHANGE AGENT OR
COALITION WITH
ORGANIZED OR
ALLIANCE OF POWER
ACROSS THE RELEVANT
FIELDS
Innovation Likely Innovation Likely Innovation Likely
or opposed and rejected. Consideration of Table I
(Part I) suggests the cascades of thousands of inno-
vations that we witness around us, indicating that
many have been successfully introduced and put
to use. But even highly modern societies after
years with some innovative technologies or other
novelties try to ban or limit the use of some of
them: tobacco, amphetamines, chemical and nuclear
weapons. Other examples discussed below are DDT,
HCFC, and GMOs. A relatively recent innovative
complex is nano techniques and their thousands of
“useful” applications. A large number of researchers
are attempting to ascertain what are their potential
negative impacts on human health and the envi-
ronment. So, the future of nanomaterials – or at
least some of them – is in the process of being
ascertained.
There have been many creative designs and
developments – from technologies to institutional
arrangements – which fail to perform properly or to be
accepted by key agents. Some such as the EU Baltic
Fisheries Regulatory Framework failed almost from
the beginning [13]. Other large-scale and initially
successful innovations such as the Soviet communist
system applied in the Russian Empire, and even-
tually to Eastern European countries, collapsed in
1989–1991 in the face of widespread critique and
opposition movements. The Soviet type system man-
aged to modernize, to provide modest levels of
welfare, health, education, yet not on a level match-
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ing many Western countries. And, most importantly,
the Soviet Union and its satellites fell behind techno-
logically and militarily in several key areas as well
as functioned in ways very contrary to democratic
norms and the rule of law [13].
Many technological developments have been
stopped, in some cases even after years of successful
application. For instance, numerous food additives, a
range of chemicals and medicines which at one time
had been used “successfully” in applications, were
later banned. For example, the refrigerant HCFCs
(hydrochlorofluorocarbons) – one form synthesized
in the late 1800s was banned in the Montreal proto-
col 1987, because of its depletion of the ozone layer
protecting life on earth from excessive ultraviolet
light (ironically, widespread introduction of HCFC
in refrigeration was in part the result of its low toxi-
city for humans compared to other refrigerants such
as ammonia). DDT is another example of an initial
success story which came under contention and ulti-
mately restriction on its use. Synthesized in 1874 and
its powerful insecticide action discovered in 1939,
DDT was banned globally at the 2001 Stockholm
convention, after a number of countries had banned
it and substantial social movements opposed its use
(but there were also key movements, especially in
developing countries, for its continued use against
mosquitoes and other serious disease vectors). The
initial ban on DDT’s use in agriculture emerged in
response to Rachel Carson’s powerful Silent Spring
[14], which mapped its diverse and disastrous envi-
ronmental impacts. It continues to be used modestly
to control some disease vectors but this remains con-
troversial.
There are thousands of cases of medicines which
have been banned because of the discovery – some-
times long after their introduction and extensive use –
of their harmful effects. For example, tragically, the
effective tranquilizer Thalidomide had to be stopped
because it led to malformed fetuses – unfortunately
this was only realized after thousands of cases had
occurred. The USA’s FDA never released it on the
market, avoiding the catastrophe of its use among
pregnant women, whereas Germany and Sweden
made extensive use of it with tragic consequences.
Not all cases are resolved. The addition of fluoride
to drinking water to improve the health of people’s
teeth has been very controversial. In Europe it is
widely banned, while in the USA, it is used a great
deal but banned in certain cities and regions – and
controversies and struggles about its use continue,
also in Europe. This is also the case with certain
vaccines such as those against measles, mumps, and
vaginal warts.
Nuclear power
The development of nuclear power has been
blocked in several countries. Nuclear power was suc-
cessfully launched and established in the case of
Sweden in the period (1950–1980) and entailed a
number of innovations in the type of reactor and in
the hybrid state-private ownership form.5 There had
been widespread consensus in Sweden among the
political parties, scientific community, and energy
companies supporting the development in order to
reduce dependence on oil imports. Twelve large
reactors had been constructed by 1970 with plans
to continue to expand the nuclear energy sector in
the decades to come. However, in the early 1970s
a few key elite actors, particularly in the Center
Party (the old Farmer’s Party) began to question the
nuclear power policy in which they participated ear-
lier. Questioning intensified significantly after “the
Three Mile Island” nuclear meltdown March 28,
1979. In 1980 a referendum on nuclear power was
held in Sweden to decide its future. The referendum
led to a partial rejection and a decision to devolve
nuclear power in 25 years (which has not happened
since no acceptable alternative energy source has
been found and also public opinion has shifted to
be more positive toward nuclear power). Austria6
and Norway7 also launched plans to build nuclear
power plants, but powerful opposition movements
emerged in both countries to block further nuclear
development.
5 Sweden developed a light water reactor designed and built
without a license from US companies.
6 In 1960 it was decided to establish nuclear power in Austria.
Construction began in 1972 with a German company as construc-
tor. But by 1997, the Austrian Parliament voted unanimously in
favor of remaining a non-nuclear country.
7 In Norway, the Government, after deciding to launch a nuclear
sector, started surveying potential sites, but a massive opposition
movement emerged, and the government backed down. Parliament
decided to defer decision until some time in the future [1]. In 2007,
Norway took the initiative to develop a new type of fuel and reactor
(based on thorium instead of uranium). The system is being tested
at this time (2015) – it is being tested and developed also in China
and India and several other countries. It leaves much less long-
lived waste such as plutonium, which is a major risk factor since
it can be used to make nuclear weapons. It also appears to operate
more efficiently than uranium and is suitable for alternative reactor
types such as molten salt reactors that use liquid fuel and can be
readily protected against meltdown. Further testing and eventual
operation will determine if the costly initiative succeeds or not.
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GMO development
A genetically modified organism (GMO) is
an organism whose genetic material has been
altered using genetic engineering techniques. GMOs
promised a wide range of very positive results.
Organisms that have been modified include micro-
organisms such as bacteria, insects, plants, fish, and
mammals. The technique(s) is a highly creative inven-
tion with cascading applications: the blue rose, crop
foods (such as rice and corn) resistant to disease
and herbicides, transgenic animals such as cows
producing omega-3 milk, modification of algae to
make biofuels, mosquitoes genetically manipulated
to resist malaria and dengue fever, etc.
Similarly to the case of nuclear power, opposi-
tion to GMOs emerged among scientists and publics
in a number of countries. This was particularly the
case of several key EU countries – in contrast to the
USA which by and large accepted the development
of GMOs. The politics of GMO resulted in the EU
putting constraints on GMO development and uti-
lization in Europe and also constraining US exports
of GMO food products to Europe. Many controver-
sies continue about the use of the development and
applications of GMO, especially concerning food
available in markets. At the moment there is a relative
standoff as in the case of nuclear power.8
Nanotechniques and materials
Nanotechnology is the manipulation of matter on
an atomic, molecular and supramolecular scale for the
purposes of research and technology development.
The very conception of nano was a major innova-
tion, resulting in multitudes of applications. There are
now thousands of nanotech products publicly avail-
able with new ones appearing daily. Nanomaterials
include titanium dioxide in sunscreen and cosmetics;
silver particles in food packaging, clothing, disin-
fectants and household appliances, surface coatings,
paints and outdoor furniture varnishes; further appli-
cations enable tennis balls to last longer, golf balls
to fly straighter, etc. The cascading of innovations
is impressive. At the same time, many researchers
8 Other applications of genetic manipulation have been intro-
duced with less controversy – although risks are recognized and
discussed. Gene therapy to cure diseases is acceptable to many,
especially patients with the category of disease being treated:
Parkinsons, diabetes, and cancers. Thus far, such therapy is limited
to non-reproductive cells; that is, transformations are not transmit-
table to the next generation. On the other hand, there are discussions
and plans to target reproductive cells – known as “germline gene
therapy – but this is very controversial and is only being tried in a
few “rogue clinics.”
and public health officials as well as publics are con-
cerned about the as-of-yet unknown effects that the
widespread manufacturing and use of nanomaterials
would have on human health and the environment.
One recent example: researchers have discovered that
bacteriostatic silver nanoparticles used in socks to
reduce foot odor are being released in washing. The
particles enter into the waste stream and seem to
destroy bacteria which are a critical component of
natural ecosystems, farms and waste treatment pro-
cesses.
In sum, an innovation and its applications always
takes place within institutional, socio-cultural, and
ecological/material contexts – with specific material
conditions, rule regimes and symbols relevant and
applied in the field or domain; and with populations
and configurations of individual and collective agents
who observe, judge, support, or oppose the creative
activities –whether they concern new symbols, con-
cepts, or designs, or new electric or hybrid cars, smart
phones, surfboard designs, nuclear energy, GMOs,
etc. (see Table 1 in Part I).
3. Discussion and extensions
3.1. The societal context of creativity and
innovative development
The introduction and development of an innovation
is a socio-historical process (see Fig. 3B). The pro-
cess of shaping innovations entails in many cases the
solution to both technical and economic problems as
well as socio-political and cultural problems. The key
point here is that often there are multiple, qualitatively
different problems which have to be dealt with and
solved in order to introduce, develop and institution-
alize an innovation. Diverse actors may be recruited
and involved in the complex process of trying to intro-
duce and institutionalize an innovation in one or more
contexts. In multi-agent processes, important types
of actors are not only inventors and entrepreneurs,
but production engineers, financial and marketing
experts, adventurous consumers and opinion leaders,
policy –and law-makers, as well as those involved
in social and political movements, which come to
influence the normative climate and relevant policy
processes in the society.
These diverse actors typically play different
roles, command different competencies and power
resources, and are often motivated by different values
and goals. The inventor(s) has the knowledge and the
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capability to formulate a new idea or to bring forth,
for instance, a novel method or technology. But she
often lacks the capital or the skills to bring the idea
into effective production. On the other hand, someone
building up production may be bad at marketing the
products, at influencing the perspectives and practices
of potential users, or, in general, at educating them.
Educational processes are often carried out through
networks of users and potential users as they com-
municate with one another through, for instance, their
own interpersonal or professional network or through
the World Wide Web. These diverse actors play out
their roles at different but overlapping times in shap-
ing new systems for producing, distributing and using
an innovation. A variety of conditions and factors
influence the development of such systems, facilitat-
ing, retarding and even blocking the introduction of
an innovation.
◦ The price, quality and service advantages of inno-
vations compared to established alternatives and
their systems.
◦ Vested interests tend to support the conventional
products, processes, and their markets.
◦ The supply of entrepreneurs and change agents
who push for the introduction of innovations,
developing new ideas, products, applications, and
institutional arrangements or new fields of educa-
tion and R&D.
◦ Sufficiently broad and powerful coalitions of
actors to pressure and to bring about required
restructuring of material, social organizational,
and cultural conditions in order to facilitate the
introduction and development of an innovation in
new markets, industries, or other settings.
◦ Historically, governments have played strategic
roles in reducing the technical and market uncer-
tainties and in spreading the risks involved in
many innovative initiatives and developments.
Established industries or sectors have their lobbies
as do relevant labor unions and communities depen-
dent on these industries. A potentially promising
innovation may have at best a few entrepreneurs look-
ing for new markets. Workers who will ultimately get
jobs in a new branch and the communities who will
benefit from the implantation of new factories are not
yet known (or, at least, not mobilized). They make
up no lobbying force – or an embryonic one at best –
while the established industries and sectors with their
vested interests fight changes and new developments
which threaten their livelihood or positions of status
and power.
This suggests the strategic importance of policies
whichconsiderbranch initiativesanddevelopments in
relation to those who may be threatened or hurt by the
decline of established systems and/or the appearance
of new systems. Apart from this, the state, business
interests, or a socio-political movement, may have
an interest in the development of an innovation and
may mobilize the powers essential to push through
initial policy and institutional changes that will open
up market opportunities (e.g., through reduction of
monopolistic or oligopolistic restraints) or other insti-
tutional developments such as legal, educational,
administrative, or military (the environmental move-
ment played a key role in the early development of
wind energy in Denmark [4]; see earlier discussion on
the emergence of nuclear power in Sweden).
Government authorities can play a decisive role
together with entrepreneurs and firms in facilitat-
ing the introduction of innovations and in getting
open market developments started. Of course, as
pointed out above, at times such actors may play
negative roles. There is often an interplay between
economics and politics. The politics centers around
such issues as comparative price developments, mar-
ket entry for new producers and distributors as well as
R&D funding and subsidies, the extent of monopoly
control over production and distribution, and the
legal-administrative conditions under which an inno-
vation may be introduced and used, for instance a
new pharmaceutical, a new chemical, or a new energy
technology (see Part II).9 The more social restructur-
ing required because an innovation entails a radical
departure from conventional entities and conditions
or because powerful vested interests oppose its intro-
duction, then the more politics is required for the
introduction and development of the innovation and
related systems (see discussion below).10
9 Constraining or preventing monopolization of a market or,
more generally a field, typically functions to encourage compe-
tition as a driver of price reduction but above all may also function
as a driver of innovation [13].
10 A mandate and the legitimacy to restructure facilitates and
makes possible the restructuring of components in fields/domains
which are not subject to market rules, such as in politics and
in education, but which nevertheless affect market behavior,
consumer practices, and price developments. The different institu-
tional domains and fields of social action have their own procedures
and rules of operation, their own beliefs and values. The coali-
tion or movement backing a radical innovation must bridge these
fields so as to link and coordinate the multiple changes making up
a social transformation and potentially the successful emergence
of an innovation and related new systems [4, 13]. Legitimacy to
restructure facilitates this task.
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Case studies [4, 13, 36] demonstrate that the intro-
duction and diffusion of innovations are subject, in
general, tomultiple facilitators as well as constraints.
The facilitators and barriers are not only technical
and economic. They are also socio-political and cul-
tural. Vested interests in existing conditions may be
all too powerful and capable of effective constraint.
The power and authority of those pushing for inno-
vations, for instance, alternative systems, may be
very circumscribed, not only in terms of lobbying
strength and the ability to influence policy-making,
but also in terms of technical know-how and access
to investment and R&D resources, or of influence on
education and research policies, as well as the var-
ious policies which influence network practices of
consumers.
In general, innovations —and the systems in which
they become integral parts— may take a variety of
paths (there is some path dependency but rarely path
determinacy). Which ones will be successful —or
which of several forms will be successful— cannot
be determined a priori (see footnote 11). This reflects
the fact that innovative developments, for instance,
the introduction of new technologies into production,
distribution and use, entail technical, economic, and
sociopolitical problems which “must” be solved as
the innovation is introduced in concrete contexts by
a constellation of actors. The actors involved often
give different priority to the various problems and
support diverse solutions. Matters of contradictory
assessment and judgement come into play. Alliances
and counter-alliances may be formed. Conflicts occur
in any case.
The resultant uncertainty must be managed by the
entrepreneurial agents, in part simply through tak-
ing professional, political, and economic risks, in
part by solving technical and economic problems and
bringing about changes in government policies and
regulations. Such problem-solving entails processes
of adaptation, and trial and error, as well as backtrack-
ing. Most innovative development is typically not a
precisely plannable activity, particularly in its early
phases. As Nelson and Langlois [29:815] argue (see
Fig. 2 in Part I of this article):11
11 Our case studies may be considered of two types: ex post and
ex ante investigations of creative initiatives and developments. In
the ex post cases, using the sociological systems framework in case
reconstruction, one maps out context, the inputs, agents and their
relationships and interactions, production processes, and outputs
that resulted in particular innovation(s). Part of the description
entails showing how the innovator(s) mobilizes and combines,
adapts, and transforms the input factors, and produces original
“ . . . it is an activity characterized as much by false
starts, missed opportunities and lucky breaks as by
brilliant insights and clever strategic decisions.
Only in hindsight does the right approach seem
obvious; before the fact, it is far from clear which of
entities or constructions, using one or more creativity modalities.
Also, the investigation may consider failed attempts, backtrack-
ing, and loops and major sources of constraint and facilitation. Ex
ante cases entail greater or lesser uncertainty about the particu-
lar inputs, the creativity production modalities, and the ultimate
design and success or failure of the initiative (this uncertainty
applies to the innovator(s) (as well as to the researcher unless the
latter has prior knowledge of successful initiatives). The sociolog-
ical systems framework enables us to identify a few key factors
that, in general, are essential to most innovations and creative
developments—and to investigate how they are mobilized and ini-
tially applied—or failed to be mobilized and/or properly applied.
Uncertainty would be minimum if the innovative initiative entails
a limited adjustment or adaptation to an established, function-
ing entity. On the other hand, the uncertainty is maximum if an
innovator (or innovators) doesn’t know, or knows only vaguely,
the entity she wishes to construct or discover; one won’t know
relevant available materials and technologies, or what might be
relevant expertise and capable and interested participants in the
project. This suggests the condition of multi-dimensional uncer-
tainty. To launch an innovative initiative, one must at least have a
vague idea or a rough design, which provides an orientation to what
would be essential resources, experts, other human resources, and
facilitative rule regimes (for social organization, coordination, and
creativity modalities) that they can or might employ in trying to
produce the innovation. Between low and high uncertainty, there
is a range of potential cases differing in their types and configu-
rations of uncertainties. As Table 2 suggests, multi-dimensional
likelihood analysis concerns estimating for a given field F and
goal of innovation, the availability of resources and technologies,
the available people and expertise (knowledgeable, experienced,
and self-confidence persons), their social organization (the likeli-
hood of effectiveness in mobilizing and coordinating people and
resources) and the possibility and skills of conducting creativity
modalities. Many of the outputs and impacts of innovative initia-
tives cannot be known beforehand, whether one is talking about
“a new vaccine,” “nano innovations,” “new sources of energy,” or
a new type of nuclear facility because the entity and its systemic
context has not fully emerged or is not clearly enough defined.
The incandescent light bulb was 40 years in the making (there
were dozens of patents). Although many variants were tried, most
tended to burn up quickly or were too costly to produce (see Part II).
Other open-ended, highly uncertain and highly costly initiatives
at creativity are exemplified by various nuclear fusion develop-
ments (for instance, fusion driven by high energy lazers) (see part
II on “cold fusion). Other initiatives at innovation include Glaxo-
SmithKline efforts, among other companies, to develop an Ebola
vaccine or Merck’s and other pharmaceuticals’ efforts to develop
an HIV vaccine (both initiatives look promising (June, 2015)) but
no major breakthrough has yet been accomplished in spite of the
fact that the companies have vast resources, high self-confidence,
and the engagement of many scientists and institutions with years
of experience).
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the bewildering array of options will prove fruitful or
even feasible.”
Policy and research concerning innovation and
new development (including technological devel-
opment) are often oriented toward “hardware,” the
technical aspects, as well as the economic aspects,
the assessment of the likely markets and levels of
demand. Social science research point up the impor-
tance of “social technologies:” organizational forms,
rules and norms, policies and attitudes which affect
the introduction and development of new systems.
This applies to the organization of research and
development, to the planning and organization of pro-
duction and use of an innovation, the education of
users, and the various institutional arrangements and
policies which facilitate or hinder the introduction
and development of innovations and new systems. We
have pointed out earlier the significance of particular
rule changes. Also, one should stress the importance
of communication and collaborative linkages among
key actor agents who play different roles in the new
development.
Numerous studies suggest that innovative devel-
opments, particularly those emerging in consumer
markets, are facilitated by institutions and programs
which provide for:
◦ Constraint on monopolization (or the de-
monopolization) of markets related to F in order
that competition drive innovation (as well as pos-
sibly price reduction).
◦ Testing and quality certification of products and
the provision of warranties. For instance, in Israel,
equipment guarantees for five to seven years
were provided in the 1960s for solar energy sys-
tems [4]. Certification and complaint procedures
have been an important ingredient in California’s
recent solar development. In both cases, these pro-
grams tended to reassure potential buyers who
were uncertain about the quality of the products,
the installation work, and the performance of the
solar units.
◦ Equipment standardization consistent with the
stage of technical development. In the case
of solar development, the Standard Institute of
Israel established and enforced from the mid-
1970s quality standards for solar equipment and
its production, which facilitated the widespread
adoption and use of solar energy in Israel [4]. Sim-
ilarly, French government standardization of heat
pumps and solar collectors through certification
facilitated the market spread of these products.
◦ Education and training of installers and main-
tenance people in order to minimize equipment
failure that would raise unnecessarily consumer
doubts about and resistance to new products and
systems. In sum, such consumer uncertainties and
market failures have been a significant factor in
the demand slump of many innovations includ-
ing some highly innovative technologies such as
GMOs.
The preceding points suggest, on the one hand,
the complexity of some innovative developments and,
on the other hand, the ability of entrepreneurs and
other social agents to solve complex problems in the
course of such developments. In part they do this by
muddling through! Indeed, muddling through reflects
the high uncertainty so characteristic of entirely new
developments.
Clearly, an innovation is not developed and applied
in the abstract, but in a particular context. It is
proposed in relation to certain problems or needs,
as a means to solve problems or to meet needs
(including that of making a profit) or to express
feelings (as in music, song, and dance). The produc-
tion, distribution and use systems associated with an
innovation or family of innovations develop in partic-
ular cultural, technical, economic, and socio-political
contexts. These shape and regulate the innovation and
problem-solving processes (possibly blocking them
in some ways, and facilitating their introduction in
other ways) at the same time that the developments
themselves lead to restructuring of the contexts, for
instance, the institutional arrangements and cultural
forms that embed continuing processes.
In sum, the production, distribution and use of
any innovation should be examined and analyzed
in its dynamic societal and relational context. The
activities associated with an innovation may to
varying degrees fit into the context of established
production-distribution-use systems. Typically, when
an innovation is of the same general type as an estab-
lished entity (or entities), its introduction entails no
more than a modification or adaptation of the existing
systems or of the innovation itself. The uncertainties
and risks of introduction are likely to be minimal.
The introduction and development of many inno-
vations typically entails complex problem-solving
processes dealing with diverse technical, eco-
nomic and socio-political problems; uncertainties
and risks are high. Inventors, entrepreneurs, techni-
cians, change agents of other types, and even social
movements play important roles in creative societal
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developments and dealing with diverse uncertain-
ties and risks. The transformation of such motive
power into the launch and development of innova-
tions and new systems can be planned and regulated
only to a very limited extent. In the face of high
uncertainty associated with complex technical, com-
mercial and socio-political processes whose ultimate
outcomes are not predictable, a direct and dom-
inant government role is likely to be ineffective,
even counter-productive. A government possesses no
“transcendental truth” or “blue-print for the future:”
it cannot “pick winners” or “weed out losers” as we
discuss below (also see examples in footnote 11).
Under conditions of high uncertainty, government
policy-making for facilitating innovation and cre-
ative developments in a field should be directed
toward establishing the enabling conditions and
incentive structures for inventors, entrepreneurs, and
other change agents, including consumer groups,
to take initiatives and to act creatively in intro-
ducing and developing an innovation. Governments
may facilitate research and development as well
as information exchange and learning generally.
They may act to remove unnecessary barriers to
and costs of experimentation and initiative-taking to
develop alternative systems. They may encourage,
through providing incentives and risk-sharing mea-
sures, entrepreneurial, technical and scientific actors
to take necessary risks.
A basic problem in much contemporary market
mediated innovation is that often the payoffs, returns
on investments, market demand, and consumer reac-
tions depend to some extent on government policies
and socio-political conditions which entrepreneurs
may be in no position to influence, for instance those
that could support improvements in research and
development, their production methods, improved
quality control, rationalization and more effective
marketing strategies. Socio-political uncertainty and
turbulence increase the risks of investments and ini-
tiatives to develop innovations and, thereby, can slow
down, distort, or block eventual creative develop-
ment.
A climate of high socio-political or economic
uncertainty makes enterprises and financial interme-
diaries reluctant to make expensive commitments.
The longer it takes to develop, bring into production,
and to market an innovation, the less likely enter-
prises will invest in them, especially in times of great
social instability and uncertainty. Exceptions would
be most likely in rapidly expanding areas or areas with
opportunities for extremely large payoffs to make
the risks appear worthwhile. The general tendency
is for enterprises, particularly well-established enter-
prises to devote their R&D budgets and investments
to innovations which ‘fit in’ or entail only limited
modifications of existing types of entities and sys-
tems. In short, this means to pursue a gradual or
adaptive path of innovative change rather than rev-
olutionary ones in order to increase the chances of
acceptance and institutionalization of innovations.
This is unfortunate when there is a major chal-
lenge or need for revolutionary development (as in
the challenges of climate change and sustainability
(see Part II)).
3.2. Role of social power(s) in creative action
and in receptivity to creativity and
innovation
Social power is a critical factor in creative appli-
cations and developments for several reasons:
(1) Social power, whether based on technical
authority, command of economic resources,
administrative power, or political influence,
is essential to many creative formations and
developments. In general introducing or estab-
lishing many of the changes — cultural,
technical, economic and socio-political —
entailed in an innovation or creative develop-
ment requires social power or the mobilization
of such power.
(2) At the same time, established power structures,
vested interests and infrastructures in the con-
text of conventional conditions and practices
may block many innovations and new devel-
opments, or, at least, distort or reorient them
away from optimal opportunities [13, 37]. For
instance, innovations are accepted or rejected,
in part, on the basis of their degree of con-
sistency with established concepts, norms and
socio-political interests (in the latter case, for
instance, in terms of the degree to which the
innovation is perceived to reinforce, on the
one hand, or to countervail or threaten, on
the other hand, established positions of power
and authority). Hence, public utilities tend to
support large-scale energy innovation propos-
als, which fit into the existing systems under
their control or which would be logical exten-
sions of these systems [4]. In Sweden, for
instance, electric space heating was up until the
1950s not feasible, because of the established
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power and opposition of the large-scale “elec-
tricity complex.” When nuclear power was
introduced, a key proponent, the Swedish State
Power Board, won the support of the building
industry for this development. City planners
interested in district heating, plumbing engi-
neers and related groups in opposition lost
out, in part because they were not organized
and could not mobilize sufficient counter-
vailing financial, technical, and socio-political
powers.12
In this way, the rapid expansion of nuclear
power was combined with new electricity utiliza-
tion systems (such as electric heated housing) which
supported the quick growth of nuclear electricity
generation and led to the stagnation of alternative
systems such as municipal controlled and managed
co-generation as well as district heating [24] (see
earlier discussion on the rise of nuclear power in
Sweden).
In general, socio-political barriers to innovation
are of two general types: (1) entrenched vested inter-
ests with considerable political and economic power
are able to block or undermine efforts to introduce
an innovation and to establish new, or to reshape
old, systems; (2) the introduction and development
of new systems require restructuring in multiple
domains at the same time that the entrepreneurs and
12 The struggle between co-generation and nuclear power in the
1960s was a competition and struggle between two types of socio-
technical systems: one, a cartel of electricity distributors (Swedish
cities) and district heat interests and the other, the State Power
Board and national utilities interested in electricity produced by
hydropower and nuclear energy. The development of cogenera-
tion required strong local authorities, able to plan heating markets
through district heating but also to exercise control over electric-
ity distribution, while the nuclear energy system required a strong
central institution able to introduce nuclear reactors, adapt parts
of the electricity supply system, develop new markets for electric-
ity, and so forth. The roles of the local authority and the central
utility were quite different in relation to the two technologies or
technological complexes [23].
Major advances in municipal co-generation were blocked in Swe-
den largely because electricity supply policies, rate setting, and
regulatory policies with respect to back-up power were largely
under the control of the State Power Board and national utilities.
The cities were faced with substantial uncertainty (determined
in part politically) about future electric supply policies, back-
-up power and other conditions, which they lacked sufficient
legal, political, or economic power to overcome. This uncertainty
and the risks it implied for large investments in co-generation
(together with the problems communes themselves had in financ-
ing co-generation) effectively blocked co-generation development
in Sweden, although the idea was a highly innovative and cost-
efficient one.
change agents pushing for the new development lack
sufficient powers to bring about such extensive multi-
domain restructuring.
Some innovations require few changes for their
introduction. They can more or less be produced, dis-
tributed and used within existing arrangements. Their
deployment is likely to be more adaptive or gradual
in character. As long as ‘entry-barriers’ or entry costs
are low, an entrepreneur has clear opportunities to
initiate the development process. (Of course, entry
barriers or powerful vested interests against entry
may raise initiative and development costs and their
risks considerably).
One may distinguish between frontier fields and
well-established fields. In the former there are typ-
ically fewer or no major vested interests to block
or impede the introduction and development of an
innovation. On the other hand, in well-organized or
institutionalized fields, powerful vested interests may
have to be won over or defeated in order to initiate
new developments (and the infrastructures of their
systems distorting or constraining many new initia-
tives must be transformed or replaced).13 To bring
about a major innovation in such established systems,
an entrepreneur or change agent needs the backing of,
for example, one or more major corporations, power-
ful labor unions, key industry associations, utilities,
and possibly the state itself, a configuration such as
that mobilized in the development of nuclear energy
in Sweden (and elsewhere). Or, they may require the
backing of a political movement or key government
agencies to bring about changes in laws, policies,
and ordinances suitable for the planned or proposed
innovative initiatives and developments (as in Danish
wind development).
Much innovation and creative action depends
on available powers, capacities, resources including
positions, authorities, network contacts for action,
and for carrying out creative operations. Particular
material resources need to be available or mobi-
lized for many creative actions; this is obvious, for
instance, in constructing a resource-demanding built-
environment or a large-scale socio-technical system
such as nuclear or hydro-power facilities [1]. In gen-
eral, an individual or collective agent has to have
access to tools and resources which are used in partic-
ular creative initiatives and innovative developments.
13 As Zeleny [37:8] argues regarding established infrastructure
making for significant barriers to some technological innovations
“ . . . The one-hundred years old fixation on the internal combustion
engine, oil and gas, etc., can be traced to the technology support
net and its constraints.”
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Access to such powers and resources may be based on
property rights, political or administrative authority
or even coercive powers.
For example, in the case of alternative energy
technologies, the technical, economic and political
influence of the entrepreneurs and change agents
engaged in developing the technologies has been,
until recently, relatively weak: solar, bio-mass and
small-scale wind technologies were not generally
backed or driven by powerful enterprises and indus-
tries. The environmental, anti-nuclear and related
social movements supporting ‘soft and renewable
energy sources’ tended to be stronger in vision and
imagination than powerful in technical, financial,
production and market realms. At the same time,
established energy and utility companies such as
those in the petroleum and coal industries had (and
still have) powerful lobbies and command consider-
able authority on energy matters in public forums and
policymaking domains.
The more an innovation radically departs from
conventional patterns and practices, or the more
its introduction requires substantial restructuring of
existing social systems for production, distribution
and use, the more opposition it is likely to gener-
ate from vested interests in the established systems,
and the greater the level of uncertainty in the accep-
tance and institutionalization process. Although there
may be attempts to redesign and adapt the inno-
vation to enable it to fit more easily into existing
arrangements, there are often technical, economic,
and socio-political or legal limits to such restructur-
ing. Therefore, the stress may be placed on reshaping
the institutional context, practices and ways of think-
ing associated with established systems. This sets
in motion processes of support as well as opposi-
tion. The innovative development may take off or
may be retarded or blocked as social groups mobi-
lize power resources and play out various roles
and strategies vis a vis the development process
[5].
Radical innovations typically require the mobiliza-
tion of powerful agents or a powerful socio-political
movement or a coalition to bring about the neces-
sary re-orientation and restructuring, especially in
established fields where functioning alternatives are
supported by powerful vested interests. This trans-
formation does not only involve the restructuring of
a variety of components linked to the effective pro-
duction and use of the innovations. Nor is it simply
a question of structuring sanctions and incentives to
allow such innovations to grow and develop through
self-reinforcing processes.14 Obtaining a mandate
and legitimation to carry out restructuring is equally
as important, if not in some instances more so, than
receiving economic and technical support (see the
cases of EU REACH regulation of chemicals and EU
food regulation presented in Part II).
Consider the case of introducing radically new
technologies that require shaping new and different
socio-technical systems. One is not simply dealing
with a slight variation or adaption of a highly com-
patible ‘new product’ but a more ‘global innovative
complex,’ which will often require social and legal
changes that cannot be carried out by technicians
or entrepreneurs, but only by political agents and
policymakers.15
14 We have in mind here the possibility to generate a sufficient
cash flow, to be able to attract new investors and bank loans, but
also to be able to benefit from tax benefits, subsidies and other
government determined benefits.
15 Wittrock and Lindstrom [35:2] who have examined the
Swedish government’s role in the development of hydro-power
in Sweden point out (also, see [22]):” The [early] development
of hydroelectric power . . . necessitated State involvement. The
development of hydroelectric power was rendered more difficult
by the prevailing legal provisions. It was necessary to introduce,
among other things, legislation in government licensing in order
to be able to develop the rivers and, build up the distribution sys-
tems...” The building out of the distribution net faced a great deal
of opposition – “not in my backyard” with those large, zinging
lines! In the case of hydro-power development, new technolo-
gies were developed, private and public capital was mobilized, and
an industrial complex emerged which could overcome the obsta-
cles of a traditional agricultural society, but this was not without
substantial struggle. To introduce hydropower demanded intense
legislative initiatives over a 20-year period in Sweden. Princi-
ples of right-of-way for long-distance electric transmission had
to be established along with safety rules. Hydro-power installa-
tions required changes in legislation in order to force landowners
into agreements about the use of “their” water rights. In effect, the
expropriation of private land for the public good was established
in Sweden in the development of hydro-power and long-distance
electric transmission systems, as in many other developing coun-
tries. From the per-spective of societal development, this was a
struggle between the proponents of two social orders (as now
between the advanced industrial order and the sustainability order
(see Part II)). The old water-law represented an agrarian subsis-
tance culture while the new was better suited to an industrial order
[25]. The changes in existing legislation and the enactment of
new laws made the new technology development commercially
viable and furthered the rapid industrialization of Sweden [35].
Nuclear power had, as would be expected, a different develop-
ment logic. The initial socio-technical changes required for nuclear
power development were largely on the production side —there
were a number of Swedish innovations (see discussion of nuclear
power in this Part and Part II). There were substantially fewer
changes called for on the distribution and use side—electric grids
and electricity consumption patterns were already well established.
Ultimately, of course, socio-political factors, in particular public
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Radical innovations, for instance radically new
technologies or socio-technical systems, will typ-
ically have impacts on different areas of society,
not simply production systems, markets, spheres of
consumption, but government policy and regulation,
education, and research. For this reason the restruc-
turing is usually carried out by — even requires for its
success — an alliance of actors engaged across dif-
ferent social spheres and institutions in society. Such
a movement carries through and integrates the tech-
nical, economic and socio-political problem-solving
into more or less coherent production-distribution-
utilization (PDU) systems. These are not in the final
analysis ad hoc collections of independent compo-
nents, but systems which are largely shaped in rela-
tion to one another, that is, part of a complex network.
Inability to establish such a coalition or network
across strategic spheres is likely to result in blockage
of or major impediments to new developments. In
general, such blockage is more likely if:
(1) A coalition supporting the introduction of the
innovation fails to emerge or to hold together;
(2) The coalition of entrepreneurs and other
change agents fails to formulate or develop an
adequate model (theory) and strategy of real-
ization of an effectively functioning system
based on the innovation, whether a product,
technology, or institution;
(3) The coalition is unwilling or unable to pay the
(opportunity) costs to restructure institutional
arrangements, change policies and mobilize
human and material resources in order to
establish an effective system based on the inno-
vation;
(4) The coalition’s social power is weak relative
to actors or groups opposed to the introduction
of the innovation and/or to the development of
the new system(s).
In any concrete historical situation, these con-
ditions are not fixed. Social learning, coalition
formation, resource mobilization, commitments and
suspicion of nuclear power, fear of accidents, questions about secu-
rity and disposal of nuclear waste and so forth has contributed to
contentiousness and ultimately constraints on the full development
of nuclear power (see earlier discussion about anti-nuclear oppo-
sition in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe). The early ‘success’ of
nuclear power depended heavily on the socialization of R&D costs
as well as other costs, which in many instances only slowly came
to be recognized: safety and security, waste disposal, de-commis-
sioning, and systematic regulation generally were all substantially
costly.
strategies undergo change. Thus, any adequate theory
and strategy of the innovation-in-production-and-
use will be formulated taking into consideration
time. Change agents continually reassess the situ-
ation and re-commit themselves to bringing about
the necessary economic, socio-political, and insti-
tutional changes. Additional resources, including
expert resources, may be mobilized to effectively
overcome vested interests in the established system(s)
and their opposition to the innovation in question.
To sum up: the change agents who are neces-
sary to bring about a radically new development will
vary substantially from case to case, depending on
the degree and type of ‘incompatibility’ between the
innovation and established production, distribution
and use systems and their particular vested interests
and powers (see Table 3).16
Radical changes call for powerful collective actors
or coalitions which can initiate and carry through
the necessary changes in different fields and sec-
tors, in part by mobilizing social power and strategic
resources. In obvious national emergencies there
may be normative pressures and social movements
enabling the integration of different interests and
16 There are several degrees of incompatibility, the highest asso-
ciated with the greatest likelihood of constraints and blockage:
(1) Minimum incompatibility. Social, technical, economic and
socio-political problems and uncertainty will be minimal. The
innovation is based on ideas, analytical tools and methods fit-
ting within the conventional paradigms and ways of thinking and
doing things. That is, it can be produced, distributed and used
within established systems, with at most minor modifications. This
entails typically minimal challenge or threat to established power
and status interests in the context F and wider contexts. (2) Lim-
ited, radical incompatibility. In this case the innovation fails to
fit into at least one important sphere. For instance, although there
may be few technical or scientific problems, production, distribu-
tion and ultimate use entail substantial problems, and restructuring
would be necessary in one of these areas. Or there may be laws
or norms which make production of the innovation problematic.
If sufficient support or power can be mobilized politically to bring
about the necessary legal or policy changes, the development can
take off. (3) Extensive, radical incompatibility. The innovation
fails to fit several domains when it is to be introduced; its intro-
duction requires complex restructuring in multiple domains. New
forms of production, distribution and use may be required. Often
legal and policy changes are called for as well. The development
will not take place without substantial coordinated changes in
several domains and overcoming the power of vested interests and
opponents. Such innovations require for their application complex,
global restructuring (see earlier discussion about the introduc-
tion of hydro-power in Sweden). That is, substantial changes are
required not only in immediate spheres of production, distribu-
tion and use — but in related legal and policy areas. There is a
cascade of creativity associated with introducing a revolutionary
innovation (see earlier discussions of GMOs and nanomaterials).
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the mobilization of resources across institutions and
fields of social activity. This has been, in our view,
a critical factor in the wartime and national emer-
gency successes of some nation-states in radically
re-orienting production and establishing new, some-
times revolutionary systems not only in the military
field, but also in education, R&D fields, and govern-
ment. There are cascades of creativity under such
conditions.
In sum, the costs, economic and socio-political,
tend to be greater the more radical and extensive
the changes entailed in trying to introduce and
develop an innovation. The uncertainties and risks for
entrepreneurs, investors, and possibly political lead-
ers are correspondingly greater. The development of
radical innovations requires then multiple changes,
problem-solving, learning and social restructuring;
shaping possibly new enterprises and organizations,
new markets and market networks; establishing new
public policies and laws, and the mobilization and
exercise of economic as well as socio-political power.
The changes which must be realized in order to
introduce and develop a radical creation in produc-
tion, distribution and use are realized or carried out
by entrepreneurial social agents and also possibly
involving their alliances. They must have access to
or mobilize sufficient authority, economic resources,
and political power to do this, particularly in instances
where powerful social agents with vested and ideo-
logical interests oppose them. A major problem in
new developments is that often the actors who have
the necessary knowledge, commitments and the will
to shape something new may lack the resources and
social power to realize this ambition. The problem
is particularly critical when changes must be car-
ried out in several spheres of social production in
order to establish effective production, distribution
and use systems (see Table 1). Entrepreneurs may be
able to attract finance capital and to establish pro-
duction of an innovation but lack the political skills
or capabilities to initiate changes in relevant govern-
ment policies and regulations, which would assure
the innovation’s legitimacy and effective realization.
Conversely, socio-political actors may bring about
change in laws and government policies in order
to encourage or facilitate particular innovations but
fail to influence business leaders and enterprises to
invest in relevant new businesses and sector develop-
ments based on a new family of innovations such as
GMOs or nanomaterials; at the same time, the politi-
cal agents lack the knowledge, control over resources,
or legitimacy to initiate business activity themselves.
In general, one may distinguish between, on the
one hand, radical and, on the other hand, adap-
tive/incremental innovation and system development
(see Table 1) [11, 24]. Lonnroth remarks [24:33]:17
The latter can mostly be handled by the exist-
ing fields themselves, perhaps with some minor
adaptation of legislation and regulation. The for-
mer frequently require much more substantial
legislative changes, possibly the build-up of new
institutions (or changed roles of existing institu-
tions) and much more political action.
Lonnroth [24:33] refers to the metaphor of “the
critical path,” where the incremental innovation or
limited gradual development has a critical path of
expansion under conditions that are mainly inter-
nal to, and are handled within, a given industry or
sector, while the more revolutionary innovations are
subject to a critical path where the conditions neces-
sary for successful initiation and expansion cannot be
met by the sector alone but requires multiple sectors
and possibly extensive government and even public
involvement.
Of course, if an innovation is the ‘brain-child’ of
large, powerful enterprises, they often have the eco-
nomic and political power to mobilize and assure
sufficient financing and political support across sec-
tors. In some cases, large companies, engineering and
professional groups and academic professions join
forces with supporters in the government – such a
configuration played a role in most instances in the
development of nuclear power in many countries (the
military were often also an important participating
agent).
In other instances, private enterprises — partic-
ularly smaller and medium sized ones — cannot
mobilize the resources and put together the politi-
cal coalition necessary to shape and introduce major
radical innovations – except possibly in a com-
pletely new, open field (with, for instance, open
market opportunities) which lacks large or power-
ful institutionalized agents and, therefore, provides
17 The development of hydro-power and nuclear systems con-
trasts sharply with that of domestic petroleum supply systems
(feeding especially into the expansion of automobile use). Market,
technology, and socio-economic conditions permitted the devel-
opment of oil and gasoline supply systems. The latter could
be handled largely through market initiatives and development
mechanisms. That is, no major political or legal action — and
institutional restructuring — were necessary domestically. Only
much later came the environment movement’s challenges to a
carbon-fuel automobile industry.
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opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises
to take unencumbered creative initiatives. However,
for some demanding projects – regardless of the
competitive context – the initiators may lack the
resources, technical capability and expertise neces-
sary to launch and establish a new development.
The more restructuring of the field (or fields)
required, the greater the power resources neces-
sary to assure that technical production, marketing,
and legal-political problems can be dealt with, and
uncertainty reduced or largely eliminated. The chal-
lenge may not be simply one of building think-tanks
and individual production plants but establishing
new social systems, training new cadres of spe-
cialists, settling issues concerning environmental
and health standards, deciding land use or other
resource policy questions. In sum, the uncertainties
which slow down or block innovative developments
may arise for diverse reasons: lack of necessary
resources and technologies, technical and scientific
problems, ignorance about potential users and about
market demand, uncertainty about ownership and
patent rights, instability or inconsistency in gov-
ernment policies, uncertainty about socio-political
movements and political developments that could
play a role in the successful introduction of the inno-
vation and the shaping of systems based on it.
3.3. Public power: Government involvement in
innovative developments — Its uses and
abuses
As stressed above, major innovative developments
entail to a greater or lesser extent the mobilization
and exercise of social power(s). In many instances,
such power is mobilized by business leaders, possi-
bly political leaders, government agencies as well as
other political actors including NGOs in order to sup-
port, reorient, or to possibly block new developments.
Understanding innovation and new development
requires a conceptualization of the ambiguous role
of governments, and political agents generally [36].
The policies, strategies, and programs of gov-
ernments and political agents may be important
for facilitating new developments by funding R&D,
changing laws, regulations, codes of standards, and,
in general, providing resources to and supporting new
sector developments and employment opportunities.
At the same time, the power of governments or
political agents generally may interfere with and dis-
orient learning and innovation processes essential to
new developments. With the best of intentions, they
may try to “choose winners,” deciding on a direction
of development which leads prematurely to the reduc-
tion of variety (but also of uncertainty), locking the
development into non-optimal or even dead-end paths
[29]. In some instances, opponents to certain new
developments manage to win the support of the state
to block important innovations, as we have pointed
out earlier in the case of powerful public utilities
and energy-intensive industries in Sweden block-
ing alternatives-to-nuclear developments (including
such innovations as district heating and municipal
co-generation) [37].
What general conclusion can be reached about
the limitations on and possibilities of government
actors to advance or to hinder new developments?
First, government agencies and policy-makers may
become involved in processes of innovation and sec-
tor development as a result of their own interests as
well as pressures from supporters or opponents of
the innovation. Secondly, the forms of involvement,
the possible roles and programs, and the dilem-
mas and risks of involvement may provide a frame
for specifying and assessing the utility of govern-
ment involvement in; new developments. Two critical
dimensions here are (i) the complex phases of devel-
opment (each associated with different types and
degrees of uncertainty: technical, economic, legal,
social, and political) (see phase model in Part I) (ii)
the government’s ultimate role (utilization and/or reg-
ulation) in the field(s)’ eventual development. Our
argument is straight-forward and can be expressed in
terms of three principles.
Principle 1. The earlier the phase of development,
and the greater the technical, economic, and socio-
political uncertainties, the less the government should
be involved in any direct or selective way (except con-
cerning legal requirements and constraints on health
and environmental risks). In many instances, there
are available entrepreneurs and change agents will-
ing and capable of carrying through the development
process, provided they are left to themselves with suf-
ficient resources. At most, they might require govern-
ment assistance in breaking down some of the legal,
administrative and policy constraints and in overcom-
ing monopolistic and other blockages maintained by
opposing vested interests in conventional systems.
In general, governments lack knowledge to make
the appropriate assessments and to solve the many
scientific, technical, production, and commercial
problems which are involved initially in the innova-
tion processes and in the ultimate establishment of
successful production-distribution-use systems.
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Numerous studies suggest that in order to be
effective, public policymaking should intervene in
a substantial way only in sectors where technical
or creative uncertainty has been eliminated, that is,
when it is only a question of choosing between vari-
ants that are perfectly well known and their evolution
foreseeable.
The state can reduce some of the risks and thereby
facilitate exploration of new, promising paths of
development. It can encourage processes of research
and invention, facilitate contacts and communica-
tion among key groups of technicians and designers,
managers, marketing experts, and users and potential
users. Such a “supportive” and more indirect role is
discussed more fully below.
Principle 2. The greater the degree of technical,
commercial, and socio-political uncertainty in the
development process, the less the state (or its agen-
cies) should be directly or intimately involved in the
process. It typically lacks the technical, economic or
socio-political knowledge and judgement capability
to engage in the complex assessment and sorting-out
processes. In particular, it lacks in most instances
the technical and economic knowledge to enable it
to foresee or plan which technologies or technologi-
cal developments will pay off and which will result in
“flops” and “deadends.” Its role in such development
processes should be limited to providing resources to
R&D, facilitating information exchange and learning,
and removing unnecessary barriers to or cost burdens
on alternative developments (for instance, blocking
a monopolization or dissolving monopoly structures
to enable competition to drive innovation (that is, not
just price optimization). Its policies, incentives, and
subsidies should encourage scientific, technical, and
commercial actors to experiment and to take calcu-
lated risks.
Principle 3. The less the government is to be
ultimately involved in the use or consumption of
new innovations or developments which will be
introduced and developed, the more strictly the gov-
ernment should avoid being directly or intimately
involved in the specific design of the innovation and
the development of production, marketing, and edu-
cational processes associated with it. Conversely, it
is appropriate and essential that the government is
involved in the planning and the management of
systems in which it is already playing a major role
as producer and/or consumer or in which it will
play such roles as in the cases of military equip-
ment, administrative and security systems, provision
of welfare services, governance and regulation, and
related processes. That is, in these cases it has con-
crete and specific interests in, and ultimate use of, the
innovation for its own activities. In some instances the
government is already involved for historical reasons
in a system that is in the process of transformation. In
other cases, the state may become involved because
it is the only actor who can provide the financing
and manage the research process. In many countries,
nuclear energy development has been such a case.18
A meta-management role for the state – found in
cells (1), (2), and (3) in Table 2— can be distinguished
from direct and intimate involvement in complex
technical, commercial and socio-political decision
processes whose outcomes are not predictable (see
[4] and [5] in Table 2).
Below we discuss briefly three general role engage-
ments and related strategies for government action
(see Table 2). Finer distinctions can also be made as
the specific technical, economic and socio-political
contexts are specified.
Indirect engagement: Role of meta-management
of innovative processes
Here the government’s involvement is indirect and
supportive, establishing laws, policies and infrastruc-
ture which will facilitate open markets and pluralist
learning and development processes. Of course, poli-
cies and programs should be differentiated in terms
of the phase of technological development at which
they are directed (cells (1), (2), and (3) in Table 2).
Direct engagement in pluralist processes: The
co-determinacy role
In cases government or government bodies are or
become active in producing, distributing and/or using
the innovation, they should be directly involved in
the innovative learning and unfolding processes, pre-
cisely as business interests are involved in specifying
the function, standards, and other demands of an
eventual innovation.
But government involvement should be partici-
patory rather than administrative, given the shared
interests of business, government, and the associa-
tions and the technical, economic or socio-political
uncertainties around the development. In the early
stage of development, when technical, economic,
or sociopolitical uncertainties are high about the
18 It should be stressed that the government, through this involve-
ment, tends to bias the technology development in the direction
of large-scale systems (in relation to the resource base of the
actors and the country). (See earlier discussion on hydro-power
and electricity transmission development).
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Table 2
Matrix of government roles and strategies for innovative development
DEVELOPEMENT PHASE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
VIS- ´A-VIS PARTICULAR
SPHERES
INITIAL
COGNITIVE-TECHNICAL
DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCTION
DEVELOPMENT
MARKETING AND
UTILIZATION
DEVELOPMENT
LARGELY PRIVATE
SPHERE
Facilitate R&D, for instance,
providing incentives to
business to invest in R&D,
prototype development,
knowledge acquisition.
Facilitate information
exchange, e.g. between
potential users and
engineers/scientists. [1]
Facilitate development of
means of production.
Formulate policies and
provide incentives to
facilitate improvement in
production and products, cost
reductions, better quality, etc.
Limit monopolization and
unnecessary market and
institutional constraints. [2]
Facilitate marketing and user
education, learning processes.
Regulate markets: quality
control, setting standards, etc.
[3]
MIXED PRIVATE/ PUBLIC
OR LARGELY PUBLIC
Invest in R&D, either jointly
with private enterprise or
separately. Engage in
dialogue with scientific and
technical networks working
on or interested in problems.
Specify function(s) and
impacts of a potential
innovation. [4]
Public utilities and enterprises
determine production
standards, organize and
reorganize production, reduce
costs, improve quality, etc.
Government through its own
or joint utilization
implements its policies. [5]
(Not relevant unless
government wants to spread
use of the technology in the
public sector or sell on
markets). Government
through its own consumption
realizes its policies. [6]
development, government users or potential users,
must be involved in defining their needs which the
innovation is to satisfy. In general, the more govern-
ment has special knowledge and competence in areas
related to the development, for instance the knowl-
edge of its own needs as an eventual distributor or
user, the more it can be expected to be, and should
be, involved actively in the development process. This
role is found in cells (4) and (5) of Table 2.
Direct engagement: Management role
This role assumes that major technical, economic,
and socio-political uncertainties have been resolved
and that the government will be directly engaged in
production and/or consumer roles. See cell (5) in
Table 2.
Any engagement of government in the produc-
tion, distribution, or utilization of the innovation may
reflect a historical pattern, where the state has become
heavily involved in such activity, accumulating con-
siderable experience and expertise, as, for example, in
the case of publically owned utilities in many Euro-
pean countries (transformed since liberalization of
EU electricity markets), or as indicated earlier, in mil-
itary, security, and related sectors. Also government
involvement may be motivated by its capacity to make
large capital investments, which private interests are
unable or unwilling to make. The risk here is that
the government engages itself administratively in a
development process where it lacks adequate knowl-
edge and capability, or access to such resources, and
mismanages the developments which it had intended
to advance.
The government may have the knowledge and the
resources (no small issue in times of budget cutbacks
and weakened public authority) to establish and oper-
ate new systems. Nevertheless, it should not proceed
—or should proceed with the greatest caution— if
it has not managed to gain a public consensus or a
mandate for its particular role.
A major risk in the case of public (as well as of pri-
vate) monopoly over the social learning and selection
processes connected with new development is that
the latter will be prematurely closed. Awareness of
this risk should be reflected in policy and institutional
arrangements.
In general, failure to base the role of government
and its strategies in new developments on considera-
tions such as those outlined above will lead not only to
wastage of resources but to distorted developments,
28 T.R. Burns et al. / The socio-cultural contexts of the acceptance/rejection of innovations
blockage or slow-down of transitions to the institu-
tionalization of an innovation and related systems.
3.4. Creative success and failure: A systemic,
multi-dimensional perspective
Success of innovation initiatives are a function of
multiple factors, a number of which have been iden-
tified in this article (see Parts I and II). At the same
time, failures of initiatives may depend on one or a
few factors. Many creative initiatives are initiated,
and many of them fail [4, 27]. As we have suggested
with some of our illustrations, some may succeed ini-
tially, and then fail later after participants or observers
accumulate experience—or the validation and power
context and/or judgment frame shifts. Also, creations
ignored or blocked in one context or historical period
may be rediscovered or revived at a later time.
As indicated earlier, the likelihood of a creative
production in a field depends on the objective or pur-
pose of the production and the innovator’s ability to
mobilize and to put together the essential ingredients
of people and resources in the creativity production
processes. Successful innovation and development is
likely to be accomplished when an agent or agents is
able to formulate essential ideas or designs and carry
out production functions integrating necessary input
resources and people. This involves (see Part II):
 Availability of knowledgeable, capable entre-
preneurial agents in field F
 Availability of essential materials and technolo-
gies to be deployed in the production processes in
F
 An agent or agents motivated and sufficiently
“free” or autonomous as well as self-confident are
available to carry out one or more creativity pro-
duction processes—that is, to a greater or lesser
extent she is free from cultural and institutional
impositions (laws, policies, monopoly condi-
tions, normative climate, and other structural
forces) that constrain the framing and definition
processes, the mobilization of resources, the real-
ization of creativity production functions.
 Appropriate norms facilitate and support cre-
ativity. In the case of multi-agent processes,
a normative order may facilitate and encour-
age communication, sharing of knowledge and
expertise, and collaboration among participants
increasing the likelihood of successful creative
outputs.
These and related factors identified and discussed
here relate to the likelihood of producing a successful
innovation. But, as we have stressed in our models,
generation of an innovation is necessary but not suf-
ficient for an innovation’s acceptance and utilization
in social life, for instance in a market (for a gen-
eral consideration of the concept of emergence, see
Buckley [7]). Social mechanisms of acceptance and
institutionalization are also an essential part of the
ultimate success of a novelty or creation (see Figures
3B and 4).
An innovation is likely to be accepted and incor-
porated/institutionalized in field F when:
 It fulfills a need or purpose at least in the perspec-
tive of key agents in F (or others with the power to
intervene in and influence the development of F).
 It fits easily into established cultural and institu-
tional conditions, for instance, the normative and
legal order at the same time that expected costs
are low and/or payoffs are high.
 Challenges to, or limitations on, the status and
power of key initiating agents is low.
 Nonetheless, in contemporary democratic soci-
eties, the acceptance process may be difficult and
slow because there are multiple stakeholders with
diverse values and perspectives who have con-
siderable rights and powers to influence creative
developments.
 In developed societies and more and more in
developing countries, there is the ready availabil-
ity of scientists and technicians to raise questions,
provide arguments to policymakers and stake-
holders about unintended negative consequences.
 At the same time, the citizenry of individuals may
not be in a position to constrain or block a major
creative initiative drivern by powerful companies
and/or the state.
 Depending on the distribution of societal power,
general public opinion may be either reinforc-
ing, ambiguous or powerless in the face of an
innovative initiative (as the history of many mega-
projects such as nuclear power demonstrate [1]).
The life cycle of an innovation is not limited to the
acceptance/non-acceptance dichotomization, at least
not in an historical or evolutionary perspective. Even
successful, highly institutionalized creations may be
ultimately phased out or substantially constrained,
as illustrated in several of our cases—for example,
nuclear energy, an EU energy tax, and GMOs [15].
Opposition emerges among scientists, in the mass
media and within the larger publics, and play a crit-
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Fig. 4. Development Model.
ical role in the constraint on, or blocking of, some
creative developments. For instance, nuclear energy
construction has been blocked or stalled in a num-
ber of countries. Similarly, there has been more or
less blockage of GMO development in the EU. On
the other hand, blocked or defunct reations may be
revived or re-discovered. The latter provide numerous
examples:
 After their obsolescence, windmills were reintro-
duced in Denmark in the 1970 s in the context of
environmental concerns and environmental social
movements. This was a major part of the renewed
interest and development of windmills not only in
Denmark but internationally [4].
 Rediscovery in developed countries of the tech-
nique of breastfeeding has been replacing the
highly innovative industrial produced powdered
milk and formulas for infants.
 Rediscovery of defunct ecological methods are
replacing to a limited degree the highly creative
industrial methods of modern agricultural cultiva-
tion (see Part II on the sustainability revolution).
We have stressed that an agent may succeed in
innovating, even radically, but that the context of
acceptance and institutionalization of the innovation
is in large part decisive in its ultimate success or
failure. The distinction between the two contexts,
that of creativity and that of social receptivity, is
a matter of degree (see [16] concerning the links
between the two contexts). Often the contexts are
closely linked (as in many groups and companies
that are producing innovation for themselves). In
a highly democratic society with developed public
opinion and widespread capacities to mobilize peo-
ple to support or oppose a creative initiative, public
receptivity is a critical variable in any consideration
of innovation and creative development.
3.5. Likelihood patterns in the context of
acceptance and legitimization processes
Table 3 provides a simple scheme of likelihood
patterns of acceptance and rejection of innovation.
The Table indicates, for instance, patterns of likely
acceptance and institutionalization as a function of
the compatibility between the innovation and the con-
text where it is to be introduced and established, the
extent to which the innovation challenges or threat-
ens key agents of power and status, or the extent to
which the initiators have superior or countervailing
power.
From our earlier examples and discussions in Parts
I and II, failure of a particular innovative initiative is
not only then a question of non-available or scarce
resources and technologies (“the need for a more
funding”) or the limited knowledge, capabilities, and
social relations of the agents involved (“the need for
greater expertise and entrepreneurship,” or the “need
for a more creative social interaction or climate”),
but depends also on oppositional and political forces
generated within institutional, network, and other rel-
evant power contexts.
Agential factors may constrain or block innova-
tive initiatives and developments—for instance, key
actors are in a position to decide over the mobilization
and allocation/deployment of crucial resources. They
may do this because they are culturally/normatively
narrow, or unimaginative, or because they have vested
interests in existing systems and are opposed to
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Table 3
Two divergent patterns: high likelihood of success/low likelihood of success of gaining acceptance and institutionalizing innovations and
creative developments and gaining acceptance. (see Principles in Part II)
LIKELIHOOD OF
ACCEPTANCE,
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Low Likelihood of
Acceptance and
Institutionalization
Uncertain Likelihood of
Acceptance and
Institutionalization
High Likelihood of
Acceptance and
Institutionalization
Degree innovation fits (or
fails to fit) into cultural and
institutional arrangements
(the established paradigms)
High degree of misfit Medium degree of misfit Low degree of misfit
Degree innovation challenges
the status and power of key
agents
High degree of challenge Medium Low
Degree initiators (and/or
possible supporters) of the
innovation have powers to
overcome institutionalized
constraints and/or the
opposition of established
powerful agents and
gatekeepers
High degree of powerlessness
vis-a´-vis a powerful
establishment and
institutional constraints such
as monopolistic markets and
stable political domination of
any opposition
Medium High degree of power
vis-a`-vis powerful opposition
and/or substantial constraints
such as monopoly markets
and tight political structures
change—and have the means to block innovative ini-
tiatives or their implementation. In a word, there may
be a major gap between those who have power, on
the one hand, and those who have creative ideas and
innovative project proposals, on the other hand. One
of the drivers of agents seeking and utilizing social
power is to be able to develop and try to launch their
creative projects—or, on the other hand, to be able to
block creative initiatives and developments of others.
Power is the common denominator.
In sum, our multi-factor model of creativity implies
that innovative initiatives may fail because of one or
more factors in the matrix of relevant factors.
Indeed, there are arguably more failures than suc-
cesses in innovative projects [27]; although through
repeated efforts, and learning from one’s mistakes
or the mistakes of others, eventual success may be
accomplished, as the cases of Edison and his incan-
descent light bulb and the Wright brothers and their
flying machines illustrate (see Part II). An initia-
tive is likely to be unsuccessful, particularly if it is
complex and revolutionary, where (i) the idea of the
innovation – its functions, performance or appearance
characteristics – is poorly defined; or the idea is mis-
leading or a misfit with natural laws and conditions
(e.g., laws of electricity, magnetism, and gravitation)
(ii) there are deficiencies in quantities or qualities
of inputs whether material resources or deficiencies
in the producers and experts (including weakness in
motivation and self-confidence) (iv) the entity, its
appearance and other features as well as its func-
tioning (and performance including cost properties,
reliability, compatibility with other systems) evoke
opposition and rejection due to major norms, institu-
tional arrangements, and powerful agents;19 (v) there
are internal incompatibilities and lack of correspon-
dences among inputs, between production modalities
and inputs, or between the outputs and the context;
subsystems or subcomponents do not correspond or
interface properly with one another.
Thus, because of any one of a number of factors,
failures of innovative initiatives are many, whether
the innovation agent is an individual, a well-situated
network, an informal or formal group, or complex
social system such as an entire society. Examples are
numerous.
 As pointed out earlier, cold fusion (chemically
assisted nuclear reactions (CANR)) groups (1989
and later) managed to produce what appeared to
19 In some cases of blockage, there may be a major gap between
those who have power, on the one hand, and those who have cre-
ative ideas and innovative project proposals, on the other hand.
One of the motivations of agents utilizing and seeking power is
to be able to develop and try to launch their creative projects –
or, on the other hand, to be able to block creative initiatives and
developments of others.
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be promising results but they were not verifiable;
since then much of the natural science community
has considered this innovative initiative as a con-
ceptual and empirical failure. (However, several
international research teams continue since the
initial efforts to conduct “cold fusion” research,
and there are regular conferences and marginal
journals publishing relevant articles on the sub-
ject).
 Linus Pauling’s group failed to identify the cor-
rect DNA structure, while Crick and Watson got
it right in the same time period.
 Germany failed to develop an atom bomb but had
top physicists and engineers, as well as resources
(for instance, uranium in former Czechoslo-
vakia), but the model used and the calculations
carried out were apparently incorrect (greatly
over-estimating the amount of uranium neces-
sary) and concluded that construction of a bomb
would not be possible before the expected end
of the war. The miscalculation and conclusion
became in part a self-fulfilling prophecy [31].20
On the other hand, in the case of the USA, in
contrast, authoritative persons including Einstein
proposed the bomb could be constructed in the
time scale estimated for the war, and there was
access to substantial technical knowledge, and
plenty of resources mobilized to bring about the
eventual and successful Manhattan Project (see
Part II).
 The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union
(1917–1991): This massive socio-economic and
political experiment in modernization—highly
original in many ways—collapsed after almost 75
years. There have been many other such “soci-
etal experiments” launched (including socialist
and fascist experiments in Europe and South
America as well as in the Middle East (Ba’ath Par-
ties modeled on Fascist and Communist parties
were established in several Middle East Coun-
tries, in particular, Iraq and Syria). Most have been
defeated in war, elections, or substantial decline
20 No less a scientist than Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976), one of
the creators of quantum theory, was involved in these calculations
about what was required for an atom bomb, drawing the conclusion
that the war would be over before such a bomb could be accom-
plished. An hypothesis other than “the miscalculation hypothesis”
suggests that Heisenberg and others in Germany deliberately mis-
led the Nazi leadership about the immediate infeasibility of the
bomb in order to prevent them from obtaining the bomb. Indeed,
there were considerable tensions and distrust between the Nazi
government and German scientists as well as problems of collab-
oration among some German research institutes [31].
in public support (however, the Socialist Ba’ath
Party of Syria still exists headed by the dictator
President Bashar al-Assad).21
 There have been numerous failed behavioral
science theories and programs: Lombroso’s
phrenology, Nazi racist theory, Le Bon’s theory
of the crowd, Montesquieu’s climate theory of
human behavior; and diverse programs to deal
with the criminal and the mentally ill (in this latter
respect, “creative” initiatives and experimentation
continue to go on).
 Alchemists over many centuries failed to achieve
many of their major goals such as turning lead
into gold. While they believed that it could be
done and that they could do it, they failed after
many trials over a very extended period of time.
Ironically, in their many endeavors, they produced
multitudes of innovations although many of these
were unintended.22
As several cases of failure indicate, agents initi-
ating innovative attempts may have capabilities and
skills, essential resources, excellent organization but
the idea or design was faulty or public opposition
and institutional barriers prevented realization of the
innovation in practice.
21 There have been also numerous small-scale experiments,
monasteries, nunneries, and particularly intriguing the Hippie
Commune movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the USA (in large
part, disappearing in the 1980s). These communes showed great
variation: some were deeply religious, others completely secu-
lar. Some became very much involved in drugs, others forbade
drugs altogether; some were more or less self-sustaining agricul-
tural units, others produced artifacts and art, while some devoted
themselves to producing music and music albums; a few engaged in
violent projects – shootings, bombings (one very recognized group
was the Weather Underground (1969–1977), a spinoff from the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)). These diverse groups
defined their own goals and functions differently, made up their
own rule regimes, and recruitment patterns, and, in general, shaped
their particular organizational and cultural forms.
22 Going several thousand years back, alchemy was an early
global knowledge development (China, India, and the Mediter-
ranean area). The ostensible goals of alchemy were, among
others, the transmutation of common metals into gold (known as
chrysopoeia), the creation of a remedy or panacea to cure all dis-
eases and prolong life indefinitely, and the discovery of a universal
solvent. While failing to achieve their ostensible goals, Alchemists
originated a structure of basic laboratory techniques, theoretical
language, terminology, and experimental methods, some residual
forms of which are still found in use today. There were many
discoveries in the course of their pursuits; they contributed to met-
alworking, production of ink, dyes, paints, ceramics, distillation,
the composition of many types of acids and bases, the making of
a solvent with a solution of caustic potash in alcohol etc. It shared
with chemistry a material perspective but entailed also a profound
mystical and esoteric ethos.
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4. Conclusions
In our systems framework, creativity has been con-
sistently and systematically viewed as a function
of social, cultural, institutional, and material factors
rather than exclusively or even largely psychologi-
cal or biological factors (although the latter should of
course be taken into account). Above all, creativity
and innovation are universal human activities, essen-
tial to adaptation and sustainability in an evolutionary
perspective and in everyday life [11, 12].
The sociological systems model outlined and
applied in the article helps to conceptualize and
analyze creative activity in a perspective differing
from system approaches found in psychology and
management studies (see Part I), in part by systemat-
ically stressing and explicating the social dimensions
of human creativity, including the socially based
facilitators and constrainers of creativity processes,
especially agential and social structural factors (see
Part I and Part II).
Major features of the sociological systems frame-
work regarding creativity presented in this article
have been (to put it in a nutshell): 23 (1) the socio-
cultural and material embeddedness of creativity: the
multiple contextual factors (material, social, norma-
tive, economic, and political) which play a key role in
driving, facilitating, and realizing creative initiatives,
on the one hand, or constraining or blocking creative
processes and developments, on the other hand; (2)
the social character and roles of innovative agents and
interacting subsystems in the production of novelties
and creative developments; (3) the multiple drivers
of innovation and creative development – curiosity,
need, fun, challenge of solving a problem, the goal
of finding better or more optimal solutions, the pur-
suit of fortune and fame, and much more; (4) social
structures (institutional arrangements and cultural
formations) in which agents and their interactions
are embedded and constrained as well as facilitated
– but which their actions and interactions reproduce
and restructure, often as part of their creative activity
itself (social structure has been conceptualized as rule
regimes); (5) the particular powers, resources, and
tools and technologies which are accessed, mobilized
23 The ASD systems model of creativity and innovation is
grounded and articulated in terms of features and mechanisms that
are socially formed, developed, and applied. See Fig. 3B in this
part (also, see Figs. 2 and 3A in Parts I and II, respectively, indi-
cating key interrelated components and mechanisms of creativity
in our general input-output model (Fig. 1 in Part I) . See also other
system approaches [2, 17–19, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33].
and utilized in creative development and innova-
tion; (6) the interaction bases of innovative initiatives
and developments including particular creativity pro-
duction functions manifested in interactions such as
communication, powering, collaboration, competi-
tion, and conflict) (“the context of innovation and
discovery”); (7) the potentialities of producing novel
concepts, technologies, products, designs and pro-
posals, institutional arrangements and cultural forms
(including those in which the actors embed them-
selves); (8) “the context of reception, acceptance or
rejection” of novelties and creative developments; in
particular key agents (powerbrokers and gatekeepers)
and mechanisms involved in verifying, supporting,
legitimizing the realization of creations, on the one
hand, or their rejection or suppression, on the other
hand. (9) retention and institutionalization processes
define and establish a creation as “valuable” or use-
ful – at least in the short-run. Over the long-run – as
with many instances of technological innovations –
creative initiatives and developments may run out in
the sand; among other reasons, because they are not
fully compatible with the laws of nature or with estab-
lished powerful norms, institutional arrangements,
and agents; or they prove destructive of much in the
social and/or ecological environment essential to sus-
tainability. (10) Throughout this article, there have
been considerations of power and resource control,
interest configurations, initiative-taking, oppositional
and conformist processes. We have also pointed
out the importance of macro-sociological factors in
creative developments and innovation such as demo-
cratic culture (Part II) and markets and politics (with
the state, large and small enterprises, associations and
networks playing key roles) (Parts II and III).
The work presented here implies that contexts,
agents, rule regimes, and resource conditions of par-
ticular fields, which are considered policy prioritized,
should be investigated to identify and map out sources
of potential facilitation of, as well as constraint
on, innovation. Constraints may be counteracted in
order to improve creative developments in key policy
areas such as treatment of new, dangerous diseases,
expanding renewable energy sources, resource con-
servation, and protection of the environment.24 On
24 Times of great social instability and uncertainty are often those
where there is a special need or challenge to develop innovations
and new systems, even revolutionary ones. There is a paradox, how-
ever — the gap between the challenges, on the one hand, and the
reluctance of many key actors with resources to face the challenge
in creative, new ways — which characterizes in part on temporary
conditions. The paradox is explained by the genuine uncertainty in
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the other hand, creativity might with justification be
constrained policy-wise and institutionally in fields
where new developments are dangerously risky and
should be restricted or banned, e.g., development of
new weapons of mass destruction, hazardous new
chemicals and biomedical innovations, experimenta-
tion with new kinds of biological materials or human
cloning (as well as numerous other potentially harm-
ful developments).
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